Richard Roth

I am a philosophy postdoc at MIT working on epistemology, language, and decision theory. Starting next year, I'll be an assistant professor at UofT.

You can email me at riro@mit.edu, and find a CV here.

Iteration and Preservation. Conditionally accepted at Mind. Draft.
How are your opinions on a supposition related to your unconditional opinions? One simple answer is Material Coincidence: when you are not sure that not q, you are sure that p on the supposition that q just in case you are sure that either not q or p (◇q ⊃ (□qp ≡ □(q ⊃ p))). I give a novel argument against Material Coincidence: given weak side-conditions, it entails the implausible claim that being sure implies being sure that you are sure (□p ⊃ □□p).
Reliabilism and Defeat, with Bar Luzon. Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Draft.
According to reliabilism, whether a belief is justified, or amounts to knowledge, depends on whether similar beliefs are, or would be, true. We consider familiar arguments that reliabilism is incompatible with defeat, and show how reliabilists can respond to them by understanding similarity in a flexible way. This alternative conception of similarity also allows reliabilists to provide a unified treatment of defeat, including higher-order defeat. However, it also over-generates justification when you learn but ignore excellent evidence for an otherwise unjustified belief. We argue that this problem is much harder, and calls for a structural revision of reliabilism. We propose what we take to be the best such revision.
A paper on assertions of higher-order ignorance. Draft.
Ordinary people sometimes say that they are higher-order ignorant, that is, fail to know whether they know something. I use this fact to undermine three popular claims about knowledge: the KK-thesis, the claim that higher-order ignorance is "elusive", and the idea that the higher the stakes, the harder it is to know (or count as 'knowing').
A paper on accuracy and introspection.
This paper is about two putative epistemic ideals, Probabilism and Introspection. Probabilism requires having credences that respect the axioms of probability; Introspection requires always being certain what your credences are. I argue that two well-known arguments for Probabilism, once carefully analyzed, either fail or generalize to Introspection. I take this to undermine the arguments. I then suggest that Probabilism is a rational ideal, but Introspection is not, because Probabilism is robust — still worth approximating under noise — but Introspection is fragile — only good to realize perfectly.
Counterfactualism for Belief and Desire. Handout.
I defend Counterfactualism: You should believe what it would be best to believe, and desire what it would be best to desire. This may sound platitudinous, but it conflicts with influential alternatives — such as the view that you should believe what is in fact true (or likely true), and desire what is in fact good (or expectedly good). Drawing on self-undermining beliefs and desires, I show that Counterfactualism comes apart from and improves on these competing views. Its signature virtue is normative invariance: whether you should believe or desire something does not depend on whether you in fact believe or desire it.

A common objection to views like Counterfactualism is that they supposedly license "epistemic bribes", implying that you should believe an obvious falsehood when doing so would cause enough true beliefs. I argue that Counterfactualists can reject such bribes if they deny that an attitude is made better by causing other good attitudes. I conclude by sketching two implications of Counterfactualism, for Permissivism and for the fittingness theory of value.
Orthogonal Knowledge, with Joshua Pearson and Ginger Schultheis.
Sometimes our knowledge of one quantity seems orthogonal to our knowledge of another. We distinguish three senses in which knowledge might be orthogonal: what you know about one quantity might be unaffected by whether you have considered another, by the other's value, or by your evidence about the other. Assuming Anti-Skepticism, Closure, and a probability threshold on knowledge, knowledge cannot be orthogonal in all three senses at once. We argue that probabilistic theories of knowledge must give up the first — the more questions you consider, the less you know — whereas counterfactual theories must give up the second — your knowledge of one quantity would be different, had the other taken a different value.

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